
5 Questions with Ravi Asnani: How AI Is Reshaping Software Engineering Teams
HappyFunCorp's Ravi Asnani on how AI is reshaping software engineering: from coders to builders, smaller teams shipping more, and what to look for in a partner.

Jun 3, 2026
Most teams chasing HIPAA-compliant software development start with the wrong question. They ask how to get certified, but there is no certification. The Department of Health and Human Services does not approve software, issue a compliance badge, or sign off on products. What healthcare buyers actually want is something less tangible and more demanding: evidence that your software aligns with the HIPAA Security Rule's safeguards, a signed Business Associate Agreement, and the ongoing operational discipline to keep both in place.
The path to that posture is longer and more expensive than most leaders budget for. Pilot conversations stall because security review cannot start without artifacts that take months to produce. Engineering velocity drops while audit logging gets retrofitted across systems that were never designed to produce it. SaaS bills triple as teams discover that half their vendor stack does not offer Business Associate Agreements. The companies that navigate this well treat compliance as a strategic decision with real tradeoffs. The ones that treat it as a checklist item discover the checklist is twenty pages long and the deadline was set by a customer who will move on without them.
This piece covers what HIPAA actually requires of software, how compliance gets structured in practice, what it costs at different stages of company growth, and the failure patterns that show up across product, engineering, and business leadership.
HIPAA-compliant software development means building a product whose architecture, operations, and documentation align with the HIPAA Security Rule's safeguards while the company behind it operates under a Business Associate Agreement with every covered entity customer. That definition has three components worth pulling apart.
The first: there is no certification. The Department of Health and Human Services does not certify software, license vendors, or maintain a registry of compliant products. When a vendor claims to be “HIPAA certified,” they mean they have built their product against the Security Rule's requirements and will sign a Business Associate Agreement. The compliance posture lives in the relationship between vendor, customer, and regulator, not in a stamp.
The second: alignment with safeguards is technical, organizational, and documentary all at once. The Security Rule defines administrative, physical, and technical safeguards that every regulated entity has to implement. Your software has to support those safeguards. Your company has to operate them. Your documentation has to prove both.
The third: compliance is continuous. The risk analysis you complete this quarter has to be revisited next quarter. The training you delivered last year has to happen again this year. The Business Associate Agreement signed with a vendor in 2024 has to be reviewed when the vendor changes its services in 2026. Healthcare software compliance is a posture you maintain, not a project you finish.
The distinction that determines almost everything else is whether your company is a covered entity, a business associate, or neither. Most software vendors selling into healthcare are business associates. The next section walks through how to know.
Two questions determine whether HIPAA applies to your product. First: will the software be used by a covered entity or a business associate? Second: will it create, receive, store, or transmit Protected Health Information? If both answers are yes, HIPAA applies. The path forward depends on whether your software has persistent or transient access to PHI, and whether your role in the relationship makes you a business associate.
HIPAA defines three types of covered entities, and only three. Healthcare providers who transmit health information electronically in connection with certain transactions, which covers most hospitals, physician practices, dentists, pharmacies, and clinical labs. Health plans, including insurance companies, HMOs, employer-sponsored plans, Medicare, and Medicaid. Healthcare clearinghouses, which translate health data between formats, like billing services that process claims.
That is the entire list. A wellness app company is not a covered entity. A fitness tracker company is not a covered entity. A direct-to-consumer telehealth startup that bills patients directly may or may not be one, depending on its electronic transactions. The covered entity designation is narrower than most leaders assume, which matters because business associate status is defined entirely in relation to a covered entity.
Protected Health Information is any individually identifiable health information that a covered entity or business associate creates, receives, maintains, or transmits. Names tied to medical conditions. Email addresses associated with appointment confirmations. IP addresses captured alongside a telehealth session. Account identifiers linked to prescription refills. The eighteen HIPAA identifiers cover the obvious ones (names, dates, geographic data, contact information, medical record numbers) and several less obvious ones (full-face photographs, biometric identifiers, IP addresses, device identifiers).
A frequent misunderstanding: data does not have to include a medical diagnosis to be PHI. A list of email addresses from a hospital's patient portal is PHI even if no clinical detail is attached, because the fact of being a patient at that hospital is itself protected.
You become a business associate when you perform a function or activity on behalf of a covered entity that involves creating, receiving, maintaining, or transmitting PHI. The key phrase is “on behalf of.” You are doing something the covered entity would otherwise have to do itself, and PHI is involved in doing it.
The test is functional, not contractual. You do not become a business associate by signing a Business Associate Agreement. You are a business associate the moment you take on a function that meets the definition, whether or not paperwork exists. Vendors who avoid signing BAAs to “stay out of HIPAA” are usually just operating as non-compliant business associates with all the same liability and none of the protection.
The Business Associate Agreement is the legal foundation of HIPAA-compliant software development. Before any PHI flows into your system, you need a signed BAA with every covered entity customer, and you need signed BAAs with every subcontractor that touches PHI on your behalf. Cloud hosting, databases, email delivery, error monitoring, analytics, support tooling, anything. No PHI moves until the BAAs are in place.
A BAA establishes permitted uses and disclosures of PHI, breach notification obligations, the safeguards the business associate is required to maintain, the right of the covered entity to terminate for material breach, and the flow-down requirement that any subcontractor handling PHI must itself sign a BAA. The Omnibus Rule, finalized in 2013, made business associates directly liable to the Office for Civil Rights for HIPAA violations. Your covered entity customer is not the only entity that can come after you when something goes wrong.
The subcontractor chain extends indefinitely. A telehealth platform serving a hospital is a business associate of the hospital. The cloud provider hosting the telehealth platform is a business associate of the platform. The managed database service the cloud provider uses is, in theory, a business associate of the cloud provider. Every link in that chain needs a BAA with the link above it. The covered entity at the top has no direct relationship with the subcontractors, but breaches anywhere in the chain trigger notification obligations and potential enforcement.
Practical negotiation points worth knowing. Breach notification timelines in BAAs are often tighter than HIPAA's sixty days. Twenty-four to seventy-two hours is common. Cyber liability insurance requirements are routine. Audit rights, where the covered entity can inspect your compliance posture, vary widely in scope and are worth scrutinizing. Indemnification provisions can shift financial liability significantly, and limitation of liability caps that a vendor would normally insist on become harder to negotiate when PHI is involved.
Major cloud providers (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud) all offer standard BAAs, but signing them is not enough. Each provider maintains a list of HIPAA-eligible services. Using a non-eligible service for PHI is a violation even if your provider has signed a BAA with you for other services.
The Security Rule defines three categories of safeguards. Every HIPAA-compliant software product has to implement all three, and the requirements are interconnected in ways that make weak controls in one category undermine strong controls in another.
The engineering work. Encryption in transit using TLS 1.3 where possible and TLS 1.2 as the floor, applied to every connection that carries PHI, including service-to-service communication inside your infrastructure. Encryption at rest using AES-256 or FIPS 140-2 validated modules across databases, file storage, backups, search indexes, caches, and anywhere else PHI persists. Unique user identification for every individual who accesses the system, with no shared accounts under any circumstances. Role-based access control enforced at the application layer rather than just the network. Automatic session logoff after defined inactivity. Multi-factor authentication for administrative and remote access. Audit logging that captures every authentication event, every PHI access, every administrative action, with logs retained for six years and protected against tampering.
A note on the “addressable” classification. The Security Rule labels some controls “required” and others “addressable.” Engineering teams reading this for the first time often interpret “addressable” as optional. It is not. “Addressable” means you have to either implement the control, implement an equivalent alternative, or document a defensible justification for doing neither. The Office for Civil Rights rarely accepts the third option. Encryption at rest is technically addressable, and treating it that way produces enforcement actions.
The organizational layer. A designated HIPAA Security Officer with documented authority, who is a real person assigned the role rather than a title given for show. A formal risk analysis conducted regularly and acted on. A workforce training program with completion records and a sanctions policy that gets enforced. Documented procedures for granting, modifying, and revoking access. Incident response procedures that have been tested. Contingency planning that covers backup, disaster recovery, and emergency mode operations, with backups themselves encrypted and tested for restorability. Business associate management, including the BAA program covered above. Periodic evaluation of how well all of this is working.
Facility access controls, workstation security, and device and media controls. For most software vendors building on cloud infrastructure, the data center side of physical safeguards lives at the cloud provider level and is covered under their BAA and their SOC 2 attestations. Workstation security still belongs to you. Disk encryption on every device that accesses PHI is functionally mandatory. Endpoint protection, mobile device management, and secure disposal procedures for any media containing PHI sit on your team.
Where teams get into trouble: treating the safeguards as a checklist of independent controls. They interact. Strong technical safeguards mean little if administrative procedures allow former employees to retain access. Robust access controls mean little if audit logs cannot reconstruct who accessed what. A risk analysis that flags ten threats but is never connected to a remediation plan is just a document. Compliance is what happens when all three categories work together.
The risk analysis is the foundation document for HIPAA-compliant software development. Every other safeguard traces back to it. When the Office for Civil Rights investigates a breach, the first artifact they ask for is the risk analysis. If it is thin, generic, or missing, the penalty calculus shifts dramatically toward willful neglect.
A real risk analysis includes a system inventory that maps where PHI lives and moves, a threat identification exercise that considers internal and external threats to confidentiality, integrity, and availability, a vulnerability assessment tied to your actual architecture, a likelihood and impact analysis for each identified risk, a gap analysis comparing existing controls against required and addressable safeguards, and a documented remediation plan with owners and timelines. The exercise should take weeks of work and involve people who understand both the systems and the regulations.
The common failure mode is template-driven. A company downloads or buys a risk analysis template, fills in the blanks, and produces a document that looks complete and does not reflect the actual systems. Generic threats, no data flow mapping, no architectural specificity, no gap analysis tied to the company's real controls. Buyers who know what they are looking at can spot a template-driven risk analysis in five minutes. So can OCR investigators.
Risk analysis is also not a one-time exercise. The Office for Civil Rights treats it as an ongoing process, with updates required at least annually and whenever significant changes happen to systems, vendors, or operations. The most disciplined companies revisit their risk analysis quarterly and treat it as the central artifact their entire security program traces back to.
The cheapest path to HIPAA-compliant software development is building compliance in from the first sprint. Retrofitting compliance after building a non-compliant product typically costs two to three times more, takes longer, and produces a worse result because the architectural decisions that made the original product non-compliant rarely have clean fixes.
Shift-left compliance means threat modeling during design reviews, security requirements baked into user stories and acceptance criteria, SAST and SCA scanning in CI/CD pipelines, code review checklists that include PHI-handling and access control verification, infrastructure-as-code scanning for misconfiguration, dependency vulnerability monitoring, penetration testing on a defined cadence, and tabletop exercises that rehearse incident response under realistic pressure. Every new feature gets evaluated for PHI implications before it ships, not after a customer's security review catches it.
The proposed update to the Security Rule, published as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in January 2025, raises the bar across these areas significantly. The proposed changes would make encryption mandatory rather than addressable, require multi-factor authentication for most access scenarios, mandate annual penetration testing, require vulnerability scanning every six months, and tighten incident response timelines. OCR received approximately 4,700 public comments on the proposal and is actively reviewing them. OCR has kept the Security Rule update on its official regulatory agenda for a May 2026 finalization. Once a final rule publishes, covered entities and business associates have 240 days to comply. The rule is not final, but building to the proposed standard is the safer bet regardless of timing. Much of the healthcare software market is already operating at that level because their customers demand it.
The teams that get shift-left compliance right share a few patterns. Security review is part of design, not a gate at the end. Audit logging is built into the data access layer rather than sprinkled across application code. Access control is centralized rather than enforced in dozens of feature-specific implementations. Compliance evidence is generated automatically as a byproduct of how the system runs, not assembled manually before each audit.
Every PHI-touching tool in your stack needs a Business Associate Agreement. This sentence is simple. Operating against it is one of the most expensive surprises in healthcare software compliance.
Most mid-market companies run on forty to eighty SaaS tools. When the compliance audit starts, leadership discovers that a meaningful percentage of those tools either do not offer BAAs at all or only offer them on enterprise tiers that cost three to five times the current spend. The categories that consistently break: customer support platforms, marketing automation tools, analytics suites, error monitoring services, session replay tools, transactional email providers, internal communication platforms, AI and LLM providers, and the long tail of single-purpose tools that quietly collect data nobody thought about as PHI.
The chain liability principle: PHI flowing through any vendor without a BAA is a violation regardless of how careful that vendor is technically. The fact that a tool encrypts data at rest, has SOC 2 attestation, and would happily sign a BAA at a higher tier does not protect you on the current tier where they have not signed one. Operating without a BAA in the chain is the violation.
The hidden version of this problem is the data exfiltration nobody intended. PHI in application error logs that get shipped to Datadog or Sentry. PHI in customer support tickets sitting in a Zendesk tier without a BAA. PHI in URL parameters captured by Google Analytics. PHI in prompts sent to an LLM API that lacks BAA coverage for that endpoint. Each of these has been the subject of enforcement actions. The remediation is rarely just a configuration change. It usually means switching tools, upgrading tiers, or rebuilding workflows.
Audit your vendor stack against BAA availability before you take on healthcare customers. The budget conversation that follows is uncomfortable. It is also significantly better than discovering the gap halfway through your first customer's security review.
HIPAA documentation requirements are blunt: every policy, every training record, every risk analysis, every remediation plan, every Business Associate Agreement, every access review, every incident report, every security decision needs to be documented and retained for six years from the date of creation or the date last in effect, whichever is later. Verbal policies count for nothing. Undocumented practices count for nothing. Documentation is what an OCR investigator asks for first.
Because HIPAA itself does not certify software, the market has converged on third-party frameworks as practical proxies for buyer assurance. SOC 2 Type II reports mapped to HIPAA requirements have become the default for software vendors selling into healthcare. HITRUST CSF certification is the higher bar, often required by larger health systems and increasingly common as a procurement requirement. ISO 27001 shows up in international contexts. Each framework has its own audit cycle, evidence requirements, and cost structure.
A frequent misunderstanding worth flagging: SOC 2 is not HIPAA. A SOC 2 Type II report is only as relevant to HIPAA as the audit's scope was made to be. SOC 2 audits get scoped against Trust Services Criteria that the company chooses. A report scoped to security, availability, and confidentiality without a HIPAA mapping does not demonstrate HIPAA compliance. Buyers who have done healthcare procurement before know this and ask for the mapping document or for HITRUST instead.
Compliance automation platforms (Vanta, Drata, Secureframe, Tugboat Logic, and others) have become standard infrastructure for evidence collection and continuous monitoring. They automate the mechanical work of collecting policy attestations, access reviews, vulnerability scan results, training completion, and configuration evidence. They do not, on their own, validate that controls are working. The trap is treating the platform as the program. A green dashboard does not mean your risk analysis reflects reality, your incident response plan works under pressure, or your subcontractor BAAs cover what they need to. The platform is a tool. The program is the work.
The cost of HIPAA-compliant software development scales with company size, and the honest ranges look different depending on where you sit. Most teams underestimate by an order of magnitude because they budget for the audit fee and miss the operational and engineering load underneath it.
Early-stage and startup (under 25 employees). Expect $75K to $200K in year one and $50K to $150K annually after. The shape of spending at this stage: a fractional CISO or compliance consultant rather than a full-time hire, a compliance automation platform on a starter tier, SOC 2 Type I in year one with Type II following the next year, and selective HIPAA-eligible SaaS upgrades focused on the most critical tools. Engineering capacity allocation runs ten to twenty percent during active compliance work. This stage is achievable, and many YC-backed healthcare startups have done it. The work is real and the budget is meaningful, but it is not the apocalypse the topic sometimes gets framed as.
Growth-stage (25 to 150 employees). Expect $200K to $600K in year one and $150K to $400K annually after. The shape shifts: a dedicated security or compliance hire (often the first non-engineering security role), a compliance platform on a standard tier, SOC 2 Type II as the default audit, annual penetration testing, broader SaaS stack rationalization, and engineering capacity allocated to audit logging, access control, and evidence automation work. HITRUST CSF often enters the conversation here, especially if larger health systems are in the sales pipeline.
Mid-market (150 to 500 employees). Expect $500K to $1.5M in year one and $300K to $800K annually after. Full-time security personnel, often a CISO with a small team. HITRUST CSF pursuit alongside SOC 2 Type II. Expanded tooling for vulnerability management, endpoint protection, mobile device management, and SIEM. Dedicated compliance program management as a function. The engineering tax that comes with larger codebases, more complex integrations, and the legacy of features that were not designed with compliance in mind.
These ranges are for software vendors, not healthcare providers, which run substantially higher across all categories. The throughline across all three stages: the audit fee itself is the smallest line item. Personnel, tooling, SaaS tier upgrades, and engineering capacity allocation dominate the real budget.
The failure patterns in HIPAA-compliant software development are remarkably consistent. The same problems show up across companies, geographies, and product categories.
PHI in places nobody mapped. Application logs shipped to monitoring tools without BAAs. URL parameters captured by analytics. Error messages containing patient identifiers sent to Sentry. Marketing pixels on pages that display clinical data. Each is a disclosure event waiting for an audit to surface it.
AI features shipped without BAA-covered model providers. This is the dominant new failure mode in 2026. Product teams ship features that send PHI to LLM endpoints whose terms of service log prompts, use them for training, or simply do not include BAA coverage. The feature has to be ripped out or rebuilt on a different model provider, usually at higher cost or lower quality.
Audit logging that cannot do what HIPAA requires. Ordinary application logging is noise-filtered, rotated quickly, missing context, and impossible to query patient-by-patient. HIPAA requires logs that capture every PHI access event with user identity, timestamp, and what was accessed, retained for six years and producible as a per-patient access report on request. Retrofitting that across an existing product is a multi-quarter engineering effort.
SOC 2 mistaken for HIPAA. Leadership believes the SOC 2 work was the finish line and discovers there is another six to twelve months of work to satisfy buyer requirements.
Breach response plans that have never been tested. The plan exists because the rule requires it. The first time the team uses it is during an actual incident under time pressure with no muscle memory. HIPAA's sixty-day notification window starts at discovery, not at confidence, and BAA terms often shorten it further. Untested plans miss windows, document poorly, and turn manageable incidents into regulatory events.
Workforce training treated as click-through. A twenty-dollar training module that employees complete during a Zoom call satisfies the documentation requirement and produces no behavior change. The OCR cares about behavior, not certificates. A workforce member emailing PHI to the wrong recipient is the violation regardless of training completion.
Risk analyses that exist on paper but do not reflect the system. The template-driven artifact. It looks complete and falls apart under scrutiny.
The pattern underneath all of these: compliance treated as an external requirement to be satisfied rather than an operating posture to be built. The teams that struggle the most are the ones that try to do compliance “on the side” while running everything else at full speed. The teams that succeed restructure the roadmap, communicate honestly about the cost, and accept that the path to healthcare market access goes through six to eighteen months of slower feature velocity.
HIPAA-compliant software development is not a project you finish. It is an operating posture you maintain. The product, the company, the vendors, the team, and the documentation all have to stay aligned with the safeguards continuously, and they have to stay aligned in a way that survives growth, turnover, new features, new tools, and the steady drift that happens in any organization over time.
The teams that get this right treat HIPAA as an organizational change initiative. The Security Officer is a real role with real authority. The risk analysis is a living document. The vendor stack gets audited as routinely as the codebase. Engineering reviews include compliance review. New features get evaluated for PHI implications before they ship. Training is delivered with the expectation that it will change behavior, and sanctions policies are enforced when behavior does not change. The compliance automation platform is treated as a tool, not a program.
The teams that struggle treat HIPAA as a checklist someone else owns. The Security Officer title belongs to whoever was available. The risk analysis exists somewhere in a Google Drive folder. Engineering ships features and security catches problems later. Vendor selection happens at the team level without compliance review. Training is a click-through. The platform is the program. These teams pass audits when the audit is shallow and discover the gaps when something goes wrong.
For software companies serious about healthcare as a market, the operational discipline this requires is the work. Get a real Security Officer in place. Conduct a real risk analysis tied to your actual architecture. Audit your vendor stack against BAA availability. Build compliance into your SDLC rather than bolting it on. Budget honestly for the personnel, tooling, and engineering capacity allocation the work requires at your stage. Pick the right third-party framework for your buyer profile and treat it as evidence, not the goal.
The companies doing this well in 2026 are the ones that recognized early that healthcare software compliance is a competitive moat. Building the operational posture takes time and costs money. Once you have it, every healthcare deal you can credibly pursue runs faster than competitors who have to start the work from zero.

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